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HERBERT W. HARRIMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
JACK TETIK et al., Defendants and Respondents.
[1] Escrows - Liability of Depositary. - Under an escrow agreement stating that the purchaser of a liquor business would
pay into escrow the full purchase price, providing for transfer
of fixtures and the liquor license, and expressly stating that the
escrow agent "shall not be held liable or responsible for • . .
distribution [from the money on deposit] prior to the close of
escrow," the escrow agent's payments out of escrow to the
seller and his creditors before the sale date were not in breach
of the escrow agreement, and Bus. & Prof. Code, § 24074, relating to establishment of escrow on transfer of a liquor license,
imposed no obligation on the escrow agent. The evidence
supported a finding that the quoted words embodied the intention of the parties where the sellcr testified that the purchaser accompanied him on the two occasions he received
disbursements from the escrow agent, and apparently the
purchaser made no objection either time.
[2] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-Mixed
questions of law and fact may not be raised for the first time
on appeal; to allow them would disrupt the orderly administration of justice.
[3] Contracts-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether a contract
has been cancelled, rescinded or abandoned is a mixed question of law and fact which is addressed to the trial court.
[4] Id.-Rescission-By Mutual Consent.-Mutual rescission involves the formation of a new contract, and the issues include
the same questions of law and fact regarding offer and acceptance that occur in any other problem of contract formation.
[5] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-Whether
defendant's sale of the liquor license of his cocktail lounge to
his attorney constituted an acceptance of plaintiff's offer to
rescind a contract of sale of the liquor business to plaintiff
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Escrows, § 12 et seq.; Am.Jur., Escrows, § 17
et seq.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, §§ 189, 190; Am.Jur., Contracts,
§ 431.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Escrows, § 15; [2] Appeal and Error,
§ 119; [3] Contracts, § 278; [4] Contracts, § 196; [5] Appeal and
Error, § 120; [6] Trial, § 310; [7] Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, § 1; [8] Contracts, § 76(1); [9-11] Intoxicating Liquors,
§ 9.8.
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was a mixed question of law and fact thnt should have been
presented to the trial court; such question lllay not be raised
for the first time on appeal.
[6] Trial-Findings-Time of Signing.-Code Civ. Proc., § 634,
relating to the time of signing findings, is merely directory,
not mandatory.
[7] Restitution and Unjust Enrichment - Applicability of Principle.-The principle that even a willfully defaulting purchaser of real property can recover the consideration paid to
the extent that it exceeds the seller's damages extends beyond
real estate transactions and applies in a variety of situations
to avoid unjust enrichment.
r8] Contracts-Legality-Effect of Dlega.lity.-The general rule,
subject to a wide range of exceptions, is that parties to an
illegal agreement cannot seek the aid of the courts on a breach
of contract.
[9] Intoxicating Liquors-Licenses-Transfer.-Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 24073, relating to notice of an intended transfer of a retail
liquor license, neither declares transfers of licenses to be
against public policy nor expressly voids contracts specifying
payments of consideration before application for a license is
made. The injunction "No ••• license .•. shall be transferred"
is not directed at the buyer and seller; the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, Dot the parties, transfers licenses;
the parties, denominated the "licensee" and "intended transferee" merely apply to the department for a transfer. (Bus.
& Prof. Code, §§ 24070-24074.)
[10] Id.-Licenses-Transfer.-Where the seller of a liquor license
discussed the delay in applying for a transfer of the liquor
license with a representative of the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control who stated that "there is nothing in particular about it, no big rush," and the seller promised only to
take the necessary steps to have the department transfer the
license, and where the entire sale was made conditional on the
department's willingness to do so, by failing in good faith to
provide for the prescribed time for payment in their contract
of sale, the parties merely failed to comply with a condition
that had to be satisfied before the department could make the
transfer, and, on the department's failure to make the transfer,
there was no reason to deny restitution to the buyer of any
·part of the consideration paid.
[11] Id.-Licenses-Transfer.-Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 24073, 24074,
relating to notice of an intended transfer of a retail liquor
license and to establishment of an escrow on such transfer,
protect the interests of creditors of the seller of the liquor
[9] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Alcoholic Beverages, § 32.
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business by allowing them to satisfy their claim out of the
purchase price, and protect the buyer from loss of his consideration if the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
does not transfer the license to him. The statutory purpose to
protect creditors was accomplished by a provision in the sale
. agreement that they could be paid from funds in escrow; its
purpose to protect the buyer would be defeated if, on failure
of the department to transfer the license to him and the seller's
subsequent sale of the license to his attorney, the buyer could
not recover the seller's unjust enrichment resulting from the
payments received.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part with directions.

)

Action by buyer under a contract for sale of a half interest
in a cocktail lounge against seller for rescission and restitution of consideration paid and against the escrow holder for
return of money remaining in escrow and to hold it liable for
money paid to seller and bis creditors. Judgment for defendant escrow holder affirmed; jUdgment for defendant seller
reversed with directions insofar as it denied plaintiff restitution of any part of consideration paid, and affirmed in all
other respects.
Crooks and Gunter and John E. Crooks for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Karl K. Ransom and Toshiro Hiraide for Defendant and
Respondent Tetik.
Irving D. Friedman for Defendant and Respondent Calstate Escrow Service, Inc.
TRAYNOR, J.-On October 19, 1958 plaintiff agreed to
buy a half interest in defendant Tetik's cocktail lounge, the
"Fancy Free." Tetik had listed the entire business for sale,
and the parties contemplated sale of the remaining half when
plaintiff had learned the business and raised the capital. They
agreed to operate the business as a partnership in the meantime. The contract, drawn as an escrow agreement on a form
provided by defendant Calstate Escrow Service, stated that
Harriman would pay into escrow the full price of $9,500. He
also promised to pay directly to Tetik half the value of the
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liquor on hand as well as half the amount Tetik had previously
paid for a deposit on the lease. The $9,500 was allocated by
the parties: $3,000 for fixtures and equipment, $3,500 for
the leasehold interest, and $3,000 for the liquor iicense. Tetik
promised to place in escrow a bill of sale to the property along
with notices of intended transfer of the license and of sale of
stock in bulk. He promised also to apply for transfer of the
license, to assign the lease, and to deliver the bill of sale.
Transfer of the license by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control was made a condition of the sale. A general clause
provided that if the seller should "for any reason whatsoever
. . . fail, refuse, or be unable to deliver subject business as
per these instructions ... " all payments received by the seller
would be returned.
Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff paid the entire purchase price into escrow and paid an additional $3,459 directly
to Tetik. On the following November 4th, apparently understood as the date of sale, the parties began joint operation of
the business. Thereafter, the escrow agent, following the
instructions, paid to Tetik or to his creditors, $6,740.09, retained certain fees for itself, and left $2,322.91 in the escrow
account.
Although the business ,vas operated as a partnership for
approximately three months, with each party assuming managerial functions and handling the finances, no formal transfer
was ever made of the lease, the license, or of the fixtures and
equipment. Formal transfer was postponed until plaintiff
decided whether to purchase the remainder of the business.
On February 9, 1959, plaintiff served Tetik with a "Notice
of Rescission" of the contract for alleged "fraud" and "failure of consideration." . Immediately thereafter, he filed an
action against Tetik for rescission and for restitution of the
consideration paid. Plaintiff joined Calstate Escrow Service
as a defendant seeking return of the money remaining in
escrow and to hold Calstate liable for the money it had paid
to Tetik and his creditors. Plaintiff then attached the tavern
fixtures. A considerable amount of the liquor was removed
from the premises before the sheriff could attach it. Tetik
attempted to carryon the business with his own funds, but
,vas able to do so for only two weeks, since the sheriff removed
the fixtures. The lease was allowed to lapse, and the business .
came to an end. Tetik then conveyed the liquor license to his
i
nttorney, keeping the entire proceeds from the sale.
The court, sitting without a jury, found no fraud by Tetik .

)
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and entered judgment in his favor.1 Plaintiff, however, was
allowed recovery from Cal state of the amount still in escrow
less $325 for attorney fees and costs, but was denied recovery
of the money Calstate had paid out .. The court did not award
plaintiff any of the business' assets, and the judgment left
him with only $1,977.91 of the $12,959 he had paid. Tetik had
received from plaintiff $10,199.09, almost the full price of
one-half of the business, and retained the fixtures, the accumulated earnings, and the entire proceeds from the sale of the
license.
Plaintiff appeals. [1] He contends that Calstate is liable
to him for $6,740.09 paid out of escrow before the sale date
allegedly in "breach of statutory duty" imposed by Business
and Professions Code section 24074 and in violation of the
escrow agreement. Section 24074, however, imposes no obligation on the escrow agent, and the trial court correctly construed the agreement in holding that Calstate's payments to
Tetik and to his creditors were not in breach of the escrow
agreement. In addition to the usual printed exculpatory
clauses purporting to relieve the escrow agent of liability, the
agreement included a typed paragraph stating that Calstate
"shall not be held liable or responsible for said distribution
prior to the close of escrow." The record supports the trial
court's conclusion that the quoted words embodied the intention of the parties and that both of them understood that the
money was to bc paid out of escrow at the time it was in fact
paid. 2 Tetik testified that Harriman accompanied him on the
two occasions he received the disbursements from Calstate.
'The court, accepting Tetik's suggested findings of fact in foto, found
that the allegations of his cross-complaint against Harriman for damages
were false.
'On cross-examination Tetik testified:
"Q. Who dictated the instructions that you were to be paid .6,000
from the escrow fund' A. I had that understanding with Mr. Harriman
and Creveling [a broker] and Mr. Creveling dictated it.
".
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
.
"Q. And when you told Mr. Harriman this did you tell him when
you would want that money' A. Yes.
"Q. How did you say it! A. I Baid I wanted it as Boon as I could
get it.
"Q. Did you tell him whether you would have to have it before the
close of escrow' A. Well, there was not even any mention of 'close of
escrow' in it. It was stated by Mr. Creveling that I could take the
money out and agreed to by Mr. Harriman that I could take the money
fi ... e days after a notice of intention to sell was passed and recorded."
Harriman stated on cross-examination:
"Q. All right, 1 mean specifically as to this $6,000, tell the Court
what you remember today of what was said on that day. A. I do not
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Apparently Harriman made no objection either time. The
trial court was therefore justified in concluding that "As to
the Escrow Company, plaintiff agreed to all steps of the
escrmv and cannot hold Escrow Company liable."
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing to
find a mutual rescission of the contract on the ground that
Tetik ratified the attempted rescission by selling the license.
Although he did not raise this issue in the trial court, plaintiff urges that under Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal2d 736 [336
P.2d 534], he may raise it on appeal In the Ward case, however, the new theory involved solely a question of law. (Ward
v. Ta·ggart, supra, at p. 742; see Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.
2d 337, 341 [303 P.2d 738].) [2] To allow mixed questions of law and fact to be raised on appeal for the first time
would disrupt the orderly administration of justice. (See
Caplan v. Schroeder, ante, pp. 515, 521 [15 CalRptr. 145,
364 P.2d 321] ; Panopulos v. Maderis, supra, at pp. 340-341;
64 Harv.L.Rev. 652.) [3] "The question of whether a
contract has been cancelled, rescinded or abandoned is a mixed
question of law and fact .•. which is addressed. to the trial
court. . . . " (Ross v. Frank W. Dunne Co., 119 Cal,App.2d
690,698 [260 P.2d 104] ; see Hagen v. Sherman, 147 Cal.App,
2d 28, 30-31 [304 P,2d. 767].) [4] Mutual reseission involves the formation of a new contract, and the issues include
the same questions of law and fact regarding offer and acceptance that occur in any other problem of contract formation. (See 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1236, pp. 956-957.)
[ 5 ] Whether in the instant case Tetik's sale of the license
constituted an acceptance of an offer to rescind was a mixed
question of law and fact that should have been presented to
the trial court.
[ 6 ] Plaintiff also contends that the judgment cannot be
sustained, on the ground that in violation of section 634 of
the Code of Civil Procedure the trial court signed Tetik's
suggested findings of fact within two days after they were
submitted, thereafter refusing to consider plaintiff's suggested
findings. Section 634, however, "has on numerous occasions
bE'en held to be merely directory and not mandatory." (Treat
v. Superior Court, 7 Ca1.2d 636, 639 [62 P.2d 147] ; Noland
v. Noland, 44 Cal.App.2d 780, 784 [113 P,2d 11] ; see Pruyn
remember who made tile original request that $6,000 be released for
Mr. Tetik, whether it was Mr. Tetilt or Mr. Creveling.
"Q. Can you remember agreeing that that should be a provision in
tll(' escrow agreement ~ A. lean rem('mber that prior to signing any
\ papers."
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v. Waterman, 172 Cal.App.2d 133, 141 [342 P.2d 87].) The
trial court's action did not constitute reversible error.
[7] Plaintiff next contends that the judgment worked a
forfeiture contrary to the rule of Freedman v. Rector,
Wardens &- V. of St. Matthias Parish, 37 Ca1.2d 16 [230 P.2d
"629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1]. We there held that even a willfully
defaulting purchaser of real property could recover consideration paid to the extent he could show that it exceeded
the seller's damages. That principle extends beyond real estate
transactions and applies in a variety of situations to avoid
unjust enrichment. (See e.g., Bird v. Kenworthy, 43 Ca1.2d
656 [277 P.2d 1] ; Begovich v. Murphy, 359 Mich. 156 [101
N.W.2d 278].) Although plaintiff grounded his claim for
restitution on fraud, the facts pleaded and proved, his demand
for relief, and the issues stated in the pretrial order entitlerl
him to restitution. So far as the record indicates, Tetik's
only loss was of the leasehold interest.
It is contended, however, that plaintiff is not entitled to
restitution on the ground that the contract was illegal. Section
24073 of the Business and Professions Code provides:
"No retail license limited in numbers shall be transferred
unless before the filing of the transfer application with thc
department the licensee or the intended transferee records in
the office of the county recorder of the eounty or counties in
which the premises to which the license has been issued are
situated a notice of the intended transfer, stating all of the
following:

"

(e) An agreement between the parties to the transfer
that the consideration for the transfer of the business and
license or licenses, if any there be, is to be paid only aftcr
the transfer is approved by the department [of Alcoholic
Beverage Control)." The contract did not provide for payment only after the state had granted the application for
transfer of the license, and the consideration was paid out
of escrow immediately.
[8] The general rule, subject to a wide range of exceptions, is that parties to an illegal agreement cannot seek the
aid of the courts upon a breach of contract. (See Lewis cf;
Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, 48 Ca1.2d 141, 150 [308 P.2d 713] :
Miller v. California Roofi11g Co., 55 Cnl.App.2d 136, 14]
[130 P.2d 740] ; Hcstntement of Contracts, § 598.) [9] The
contract herein, however, was not illegal, and no considerations
of public policy require tl'l'ating it as such. Business and
««
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Professions Code section 24073 neither declares transfers of
licenses to be against public policy nor expressly voids contracts specifying payments of consideration before application for a license transfer is made. The injunction "No ...
license . . . shall be transferred . . ." is not directed at the
buyer and the seller. The Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, not the parties, transfers licenses. The parties, denominated the "licensee" and the "intended transferee"
merely apply to the department for a transfer. (Bus. & Prof.
. Code, §§ 24070-24074; see Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 52 Ca1.2d 259, 261-262, 264 [341 P.2d
291] ; Ri.shwain v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
162 Cal.App.2d 207 [328 P.2d 473].) Realizing this, the
parties did not purport to transfer the license themselves.
[10] Tetik discussed the delay in applying for a transfer
with a representative of the department who, in Tetik's words,
stated that "there is nothing in particular about it, no big
rush." Tetik promised only to take the necessary steps to have
the department transfer the license, and the entire sale was
made conditional on the department's willingness to do so.
By failing in good faith to provide for the prescribed time
for payment in their contract, the parties merely failed to
comply with a condition that had to be satisfied before the
department could make the transfer. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to deny restitution. (See generally,
Grodecki, 111 Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis,
71 L.Q.Rev. 254; Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired
Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 261.)
[11] Sections 24073 and 24074 of the Business and
Professions Code protect the interests of creditors of the
seller by allowing them to satisfy their claims out of the
purchase price. They also protect the buyer from loss of his
consideration if the department does not transfer the license
to him. In this case, the creditors of Tetik were fully protected by a provision in the agreement that the creditors could
be paid from funds in escrow. Thus the statutory purpose to
protect creditors was accomplished, and its purpose to protect
the buyer would be defeated if he could not recover the
seller's unjust enrichment.
The judgment as to defendant Calstate is affirmed. The
judgment is reversed insofar as it denies plaintiff restitution
of any part of the consideration paid, and the trial court is
directed to retry the issue of the amount thereof to which be
is entitled. In aU other respects the judgment is affirmed.
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Defendant Calstate is awarded its costs on this appeal. Plaintiff and defendant Tetik are to bear their own costs on this
appeal.
.Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., llcComb, J. t Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 26396. In Bank.

Nov. 16, 1961.]

EDWARD LOUIS MALENGO, JR., Petitioner, v. THE
MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE EAST LOS ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES
COUNTY et aI., Respondents j THE PEOPLE, Real
Party in Interest.
[1] Criminal Law - Time of Trial- Continuances.-Under Pen.
Code, § 1382, subd. 3, as amended in 1959, providing for dismissal of an action when defendant in a misdemeanor case ie:
not brought to trial within 30 days after he is arrested and
brought within the jurisdiction of the court "except that an
action shall not be dismissed" if it is set for trial on a date
beyond the 30-day period at defendant's request or with his
consent, express or implied, and if defendant is brought to
trial on the day so set for trial or within 10 days thereafter,
the court did not abuse its discretion, after a date was fixed
for trial beyond the statutory 30-day period, in granting the
People's motion for a one-week continuance in the absence of
a showing that defendant could not have appeared for trial
within ten days after the date fixed or even within the seven
days requested by the People. Under such circumstances defendant could not choose a later trial date, to which the trial
was in fact continued, and then complain that he was not
brought to trial within the time prescribed by law j he must be
deemed to have waived any objection to thecontinuaJice to the
date thus chosen by him.
[2] Id.-Time of Trial-Continuances.-Pen. Code, § 1050, providing that "no continuance of a criminal trial shall be granted
except upon affirmative proof in open court, upon reasonable
notice, that the ends of justice require a continuance" is
directory only, not mandatory; it contains no provision for the
dismissal of a case when its terms are not complied with.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Continuance, § 4 et seq. j Am.Jur., Trial,
§ 14 et seq.
Kelt. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 250.

